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STATUTORY COMMENT

The Illinois Criminal Sexual
Assault and Abuse Act

Traditional legal theories concerning rape, based largely on out-

moded societal attitudes toward women, have been successfully

challenged and changed in recent years. Since 1975, nearly every state
has enacted some type of rape reform legislation.' The new laws are
aimed primarily at increasing the percentage of reports and convictions while protecting the interests of the victims. Illinois' newly enacted
1. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-60 to -70 (1982); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410 -. 470
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1401 to -1414 (1978 & Supp. 1983-1984); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1801 to -1813 (1977 & Supp. 1983); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261-268,

(1983);

283-291.5 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-401 to -414 (1978 & Supp.
11983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-65 to -73a (1972 & Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761-763 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2801 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 794.011-.05 (West 1976 & Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-2001 to -2020.1
(1981 .& Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. 707-730 to -738 (1976 & Supp. 1983); IDAHO
CODE §§ 18-6101 to -6107, -6601 to -6608 (1979 & Supp. 1983); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, §§ 12-12 to -18 (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-4-1 to -4-4 (Burns
Supp. 1983); IowA CODE ANN. § 709.1 -. 12 (West 1979 & Supp. 1983-1984); KAN.

§§ 21-3501 to -3525 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983);
§§ 510.010-.150 (Bobbs-Merrill 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1982);

STAT. ANN.

Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 251-255 (1964
& Supp. 1983-1984); MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 461-4652 (1982 & Cum. Supp.
1983); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, §§ 22-24B (Supp. 1984-1985); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520a-.5201 (Supp. 1984-1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.34 -. 351
(West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-65 to -71, -95 to -103 (1972 & Supp.
1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.010 - .130 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 45-5-501 to -511 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-317 to -323 (1979); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 200.364 - .375 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:1 - :8 (Cum.

§§ 14:41 - :43.2 (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV.

Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:14-1 to 14-8 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 30-9-10 to -17 (1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.00 - .70 (McKinney 1975 & Supp.
1983-1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.1 - .10 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983); N.D.

CENT. CODE §§

12.1-20-01 to -15 (1976 & Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
2907.01 - .12 (Page 1982 & Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1111-1123
(1983 & Supp. 1983-1984); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 163.305 - .495 (1983); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3101-3127 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-1 to -14 (1956
& Cum. Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-651 to -730 (Law. Co-op. 1976 &
Cum. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-22-1 to -25 (1979 & Supp. 1983);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-601 to -614 (1982 & Supp. 1983); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN;

§§
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Criminal Sexual Assault and Abuse Act 2 is a comprehensive revision,
consolidating a variety of sex offense statutes applicable to adult and
child victims. The Act recategorizes these offenses into four types of
criminal sexual conduct, penalized according to the severity and
reprehensibility of each offense.3 The new law extends to previously
unprotected victims," and eliminates the resistance and consent standards required under the common law.'
This comment will trace the development of forcible rape law

6
in Illinois under the common law based carnal knowledge statute.
It will examine erroneous assumptions concerning the rape victim which
formed the basis for the traditional rape laws and which prompted
numerous commentators to call for reform. The Criminal Sexual
Assault and Abuse Act will be analyzed according to three broad
categories of reform: the reorganized criminal sexual conduct structure; the identification of victims protected by the new law; and the
classification of the new offenses based upon the degree of force used.

Finally, some general conclusions will be drawn regarding the impact
of this newest approach to sex offense legislation-the sexual con-

duct statute.7

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-401
to -411 (Supp. 1983 & Interim Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 3251-3255
(Cum. Supp. 1983-1984); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-61 to -67.10 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 9A.44.010 - .120 (Cum. Supp. 1984-1985); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8B-1 to -13 (1977);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West 1982 & Cum. Supp. 1983-1984); Wyo. STAT.
§§ 6-2-301 to -312 (1983).
2. P.A. 83-1067, 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 7077 (West) (to be codified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 12-12 to 12-18, and amending the language of numerous scattered sections).
3. The previous rape crime required serious sexual imposition, and was only
punishable as a Class X felony. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (1983).
4. For instance, the new law is gender neutral rather than protective only of
women. Additionally, the state may now prosecute cases of spousal rape under the
aggravated criminal sexual assault section, which is the most serious of the four offenses. See infra notes 152-66 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 167-76 and accompanying text.
6. Prior to the passage of the Criminal Sexual Assault and Abuse Act, Illinois retained the common law definition of rape. "A male person of the age of
14 years and upwards who has sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife, by
force and against her will, commits rape." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (1983)
(repealed eff. July 1, 1984).
7. The first comprehensive redraft of sexual offenses was the Michigan Criminal
Sexual Conduct Statute. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520a-.5201 (Supp.
1983-1984). Since that time 23 states, now including Illinois, have modeled rape reform
statutes after the Michigan law. State legislatures have adopted various names for

§§ 21.01 - .13 (Vernon 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1982-1983);
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ESTABLISHING THE CRIME OF RAPE UNDER THE CARNAL
KNOWLEDGE STATUTE

The three major statutory approaches to criminal sexual offenses
are exemplified by the carnal knowledge statute,' the Model Penal

Code,9 and the sexual conduct statute.' 0 Variations of these three are
currently followed in all fifty states.' The latter two approaches are
comparatively recent developments, 2 intended to remedy various problems inherent in the carnal knowledge statutes. This section will ex-

amine some of those problems and their impact on rape trials under
the earlier statutes.
A.

FORCE, CONSENT OR RESISTANCE?

Since the common law definition of rape was originally codified
in Illinois, courts have continually searched for a precise definition

of the major element of the offense. In addition to the act of sexual
intercourse,' 3 the prosecution has been required to prove that the act
was by force, against the victim's will or without her consent. While
in some states each phrase denotes a separate element, in others the

terms are interchangeable." Although used interchangeably, subtle dif-

ferences in the meaning of the phrases may be discerned. An act committed "against her will" suggests that the victim used some degree
of active resistance, while "without her consent" indicates that approval or acquiescence was withheld. In Illinois, lack of consent

such provisions (i.e., assault, abuse, conduct) but all of the laws focus on the conduct of the accused. These statutes will therefore be referred to as "sexual conduct
statutes."
8. See supra note 6.
9. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 213 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
10. See supra note 7.
11. It is impossible to fit sex offense statutes from 50 jurisdictions precisely
into one of three categories. Yet, in most states it is possible to trace the derivation
of the law to one of the three statutory approaches listed.
12. See infra notes 100-15 for a discussion of recent statutory approaches.
13. Under the carnal knowledge statute "[s]exual intercourse occurs when there
is any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 11-1(b) (1983) (repealed eff. July 1, 1984). Other forms of penetration
were addressed separately under the deviate sexual assault section. See id. §§ 11-2
& 11-3.
14. State criminal codes adopted variations on the carnal knowledge language.
Some examples include CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1970) (amended 1983): "Rape
is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a female . . . (3) Where she resists,
but her resistance is overcome by force or violence; (4) Where she is prevented from
resisting by threats of great and immediate bodily harm . . . ."; ALA. CODE §
13A-6-61(a) (1975): "A male commits the crime of rape in the first degree if: (1)
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emerged as the primary element in the rape crime; evidence of force
and resistance were used as indicators of nonconsent.' 5
Most early courts raised the resistance requirement to the level
of a separate element.' 6 Traditionally, the law focused on the conduct of the complaining witness, and overt resistance was considered
indicative of the victim's state of mind. In the early case of Brown
v. State,' 7 the complainant testified that she had been raped by a
neighbor boy whom she knew well. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court overruled the jury's conviction, determining that the plaintiff
had failed to meet the utmost resistance requirement.' 8 The court
asserted that resistance was an indispensable requisite to the charge
of rape, and that "there must be the most vehement exercise of every
physical means or faculty within the woman's power to resist.''' 9 Thus
the standard for utmost resistance entailed two distinct findings: first,
that the victim used her utmost physical capacity; and second, that
her resistance did not abate at any time prior to or during consummation of the act.20
Subsequent case law gradually eroded this harsh requirement which
had made proving a charge of rape an impossible burden in all but
the most brutal cases. Recently Illinois courts have excused lack of
resistance in situations where the actor threatened to do violence, 21
when resistance would have been futile or life endangering, 22 or when
the victim was overcome by superior strength or paralyzing fear.23
Evidence of physical injury to the victim's body is no longer necessary
to sustain a rape conviction.24
He engages in sexual intercourse with a female by forcible compulsion

....

";

id.

at § 13A-6-70(b): "Lack of consent results from: (1) forcible compulsion ... "
App. 3d 206, 210-11, 311 N.E.2d 361, 364
15. People v. Montgomery, 19 Ill.
(1974).
16. Mills v. United States, 164 U.S. 644 (1897). The Court indicated that "[tihe
mere non-consent of a female to intercourse . . .does not constitute the crime of

rape." Id. at 648. "[I1t must also be made to appear that she did resist to the extent
of her ability at the time and under the circumstances." Id. at 649.
17. 127 Wis. 193, 106 N.W. 536 (1906).
18. Id. at 197, 106 N.W. at 538-39.
19. Id. at 196, 106 N.W. at 538.
20. See, e.g., Starr v. State, 205 Wis. 310, 237 N.W. 96 (1931).
21. People v. Schmitt, 99 Il1. App. 3d 184, 429 N.E.2d 1267 (1981) (defendant
threatened to kill victim if she cried out for help).
22. People v. Genus, 74 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 393 N.E.2d 1162 (1979) (victim
in dark elevator ordered by assailants to remain quite or they would "blow [her]
. . . brains out").

23. People v. Muellner, 70 Ill. App. 3d 671, 388 N.E.2d 851 (1979) (victims
raped by several perpetrators).
24. People v. Thomas, 96 Ill. App. 3d 443, 421 N.E.2d 357 (1981) (sufficient

[1984:355]

CRIMINAL SEXUAL ASSAULTACT

Despite these more progressive interpretations, there remains no
definite standard for determining the amount of resistance required.
However an Illinois appellate court, in People v. Montgomery,2 5
recognizing that a rape conviction requires an act against the victim's
will, adopted a good faith resistance standard.2 6 The appropriate
amount of resistance was viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances. While force and resistance were outward objective indicators, the court's ultimate goal was to determine whether the complainant consented to the act of sexual intercourse.2 7 Nonconsent was
presumed when the force used was unusually brutal, or when there
was substantial corroborating evidence that the act occurred. 28
Rape was the only violent crime committed against the person
which required a showing of resistance. 9 Although the credibility of
a complaining witness is often closely scrutinized, in no other serious
crime is the victim's behavior at the time of the assault so openly
and critically analyzed.3" Arguably, the elements of the crime of rape
and the governing rules of evidence should parallel those applicable
to other violent crimes against the person. 3 ' In addition, active
resistance in many instances enhances the risk of harm, especially when
there are no viable means of escape, or where the assailant displays
a dangerous weapon. Police officers and other experts in the area
advise against resistance when there is real, inescapable danger.32 Thus
corroborating evidence to support rape conviction).
25. 19 Ill. App. 3d 206, 311 N.E.2d 361 (1974).
26. Id. at 210, 311 N.E.2d at 364.
27. Id. at 210-11, 311 N.E.2d at 364.
28. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 28 Ill. 2d 566, 192 N.E.2d 873 (1963) (two
eyewitnesses identified defendant in a lineup).
29. Illinois law does not require the prosecution to prove the victim resisted
in cases of homicide, assault, battery or theft. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-1, 12-1,
12-3, 16-1 (1983).
30. ILLINOIs HOUSE DEBATES, H.B. 606, 83d Sess:, 42d Legislative Day (May
10, 1983) (statements of Rep. Jaffe, House sponsor) (available on microfiche at
163-64).
31. See generally Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in
the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977); contra Note, The Resistance Standard
in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 680 (1966) (the resistance standard should
be adopted as the only objective outward indicator of nonconsent).
32. See, e.g., F. SToRAsKA, How To SAY No To A RAPIST AND SURVIVE 30-109
(1975); see also M. AMIR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 155 (1971). Amir conducted
a study in forcible rape, using statistics derived from Philadelphia police reports for
the years 1958 and 1960. His sample consisted of 646 victims and 1,292 offenders.
Id. at 37. Amir's study indicated that there was a correlation between the amount
of physical resistance shown by the victim and the severity of the violence to which
she was subjected. Id. at 170-71.
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the evidentiary and legal requirements for proving rape actually mandate physical resistance, directly contradicting advice given by those
responsible for enforcing the law.
B.

ADMISSIBILITY OF SEXUAL HISTORY EVIDENCE

One of the most widely debated issues in the area of sex offense
legislation is the admissibility of evidence relating to the victim's past
sexual relations with the defendant and others. Until recently, most,
courts allowed testimony concerning the complainant's general reputation for unchastity 33 Such evidence was permitted either to impeach
the credibility of the plaintiff or to show that the act of intercourse
was consensual. A minority of jurisdictions also allowed evidence of
3'
specific instances of prior sexual conduct.
Due to the highly prejudicial nature of sexual history evidence
and its invasion of the complaining witness's privacy, various interest
groups have called for extensive reform. The admissibility of evidence
makes the rape trial especially traumatic for the victim." It has been
argued that by allowing the defense to examine the victim on such
details, and by presenting witnesses to impeach her credibility, the
focus of the trial shifts to the victim's conduct rather than the actual
assault. 1

Most states have responded by enacting "rape shield" laws which

place stricter limits on the admission of evidence." In 1977 the Illinois
33. See IA J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 62 (P. Tillers
rev. ed. 1983). "The admissibility, on a rape charge, of the complainant's character
for chastity or unchastity is generally conceded." Id. at 1261, quoting J. WIGMORE
(3d ed. 1940) (footnote omitted). See generally People v. Collins, 25 111. 2d 605,
611, 186 N.E.2d 30, 33 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 942 (1963) (evidence of general
reputation for unchastity, not of specific instances of prior sexual activity with others,
is admissible); People v. Gray, 251 11. 431, 442, 96 N.E. 268, 273 (1911) (general
reputation for lack of chastity admissible when consent is at issue and complainant
is above the age of consent).
34. See IA J. WIGMORE, supra note 33, § 62.1 at 1313 & n.4 (admissible to
show likelihood that plaintiff consented).
35. See generally S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WELL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE
387-454 (1976); Berger, supra note 31.
36. See, e.g., Note, Evidence-Rape Trials-Victim's Prior Sexual History, 27

L. REV. 362 (1975) (Under the old law admitting evidence of prior sexual
activity, the rape prosecution became a long line of degrading experiences for the
victim, beginning with the rape itself.).
37. Forty-four states have recently adopted some form of evidence preclusion
BAYLOR

statute. See supra note 1.
The scope of permissible past sexual history evidence varies widely among
jurisdictions. The polar extremes are represented by those statutes which' give the
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38
legislature enacted an extremely restrictive statute, which allows
evidence of prior sexual conduct with the accused only after the judge
has held an in camera hearing to determine the probative value of
the proffered testimony. All other sexual history evidence is presumed
inadmissible. 3 9 Only one other state has adopted an equally restrictive law.40 At least one commentator has suggested that the scope
of protection in the Illinois statute is too broad in certain instances,
41
excluding legally relevant information. While the prosecution has

judge complete discretion on one end, and those which impose strict legislative rules
as to what is or is not admissible on the other.
Illustrative of the former is the Texas statute which allows the admission of
general reputation evidence, specific instances of prior sexual conduct or opinion
evidence if the judge finds that the probative value outweighs potential prejudice
and the evidence is material to a fact in issue. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.13 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). This statute is potentially much more permissive than the
majority rule applied prior to the widespread adoption of rape shield laws, which
only permitted evidence of general reputation for chastity. See supra note 33.
Conversely, the Louisiana statute strictly proscribes prior sexual history evidence
by barring "[elvidence of prior sexual conduct and reputation for chastity of a vic-

tim of rape . . . except for incidents arising out of the victim's relationship with
the accused." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West 1981).

Both approaches have been criticized. The discretionary type of statute is geared
toward ensuring the defendant a fair trial. However, opponents fear that judges are
over-inclusive, finding consent whenever there is any indication of prior consensual
activity. Judges also tend to distrust the complaining witness in some cases, depending upon the context from which the crime stems-for instance, in those situations
where victim and defendant met in a bar. "Judges have several graphic ways of
describing this situation: 'friendly rape,' 'felonious gallantry,' 'assault with failure
to please,' and 'breach of contract.' " Bohmer, Judicial Attitudes Toward Rape Victims, 57 JUDICATURE 303, 305 (1975).
Rules which explicitly limii evidence are designed to protect the interests of
the victim. Critics contend that such laws present a formidable threat to defendants'
due process rights. Advantages include uniform application of the law, and the deterrence of the impact of judicial bias.
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7 (1983).
39. Id. § 115-7(a). In a rape prosecution there are three basic defense theories:
first, that the victim consented; second, that a rape did indeed occur but the defendant was not the actual perpetrator; and finally, that no sexual penetration occurred.
The Illinois law allows the judge to consider whether the defendant has sufficient
evidence of prior sexual activity with the alleged victim to impeach the testimony
if the contact is denied. Id. § 115-7(b). This evidence would support the defense
of consent. However the rape shield law bars evidence which could be highly probative of the second defense: that the defendant did not commit the assault. Some
other jurisdictions circumvent this possible limitation on the defendant's right by
allowing evidence as to the origin of semen, pregnancy or disease. See, e.g., OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.'02(D)-(E) (Page Supp. 1982).
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3104 (Purdon 1983).
41. Comment, The Illinois Rape Shield Statute: Will It Withstand Constitu-
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a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy and dignity of the victim from unwarranted intrusion, the defendant has a constitutionally
guaranteed right to confront the witnesses against him. 2
However, the rape shield provision has survived constitutional
attack in Illinois courts. For instance, in People v. Buford,'4 the defendant claimed that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated
when he was prevented from introducing evidence that the plaintiff
had previously been convicted of prostitution. The court held that
even if the statute denied the defendant's right to confront witnesses
against him, the error was harmless since proof of defendant's guilt
was overwhelming and the probative impact of the evidence was
negligible." Other Illinois courts have explicitly found that the rape
shield provision does not violate the confrontation clause. 45 The statute
has also survived challenges on due process grounds. 6
C.

EXAMINATION OF THE VICTIM'S CONDUCT AS AN
INDICATOR OF NONCONSENT: REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED
BY JUDGE AND JURY

Under the carnal knowledge law, juries are presented with evidence
of force and resistance as outward indicators of the victim's consent
to the act. Different jurisdictions allow varying amounts of evidence
regarding the plaintiff's prior sexual conduct, which presumably indicate the likelihood that the prosecutrix did consent. Kalven and
Zeisel, co-authors of a seminal study of the American jury,4 asserted
tional Attack?, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 236-37. The author proposed that the

rape shield law be amended to allow admission of evidence of a specific sexual act
by the alleged victim, after an in camera hearing to determine its probative value,
when that evidence would prove the existence of an alternative source of semen or
personal injury.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused

shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him; [and]
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . .. ."

The Illinois Constitution provides that "[in criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face and to have process

to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf." ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
43. 110 11. App. 3d 46, 441 N.E.2d 1235 (1982).
44. Id. at 52-53, 441 N.E.2d at 1240.
45. See, e.g., People v. Comes, 80 Ill. App. 3d 166, 399 N.E.2d 1346 (1980).
46. See, e.g., People v. Requena, 105 Ill. App. 3d 831, 835, 435 N.E.2d 125,
128 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1191 (1983) (no due process violation since the
defendant was not denied an opportunity to cross-examine the witness as to her
veracity and credibility); People v. Comes, 80 11. App. 3d 166, 399 N.E.2d 1346
(1980) (defendant not denied an opportunity to attack complainant's veracity).
47. H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966) [hereinafter cited

CRIMINAL SEXUAL ASSAULT ACT
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that juries apply an additional, albeit informal, requirement. According to the authors, the jury goes beyond the main issue of consent

8
to closely scrutinize the victim's conduct at the time of the act." The
jury will be more lenient with the defendant when there is a showing

of "contributory behavior," creating an inference that the victim
assumed the risk of the attack. 9
Statements made by the trial judge bolster the jury's informal
application of an assumption of risk test demonstrating that remnants
0
of the "unchaste woman" sentiment still survive.1 In the words he
or she chooses to describe the case, the judge may express a belief
that the victim's behavior somehow precipitated the rape.' For instance, one judge explained that the "[w]oman involved went to a
public dance and was picked up by the defendant." She "[tihen went
to [a] night club and permitted defendant to take her home over unfrequented road. . . .[The] woman involved [was] twice married and
divorced .... .""

The implication was that the parties may have

been drinking, that the victim was a voluntary social companion,
and that the woman had engaged in prior sexual activities with the
defendant or other men." ' This bias may unconsciously work its way
into the jury deliberations."
3

as

THE AMERICAN

JURY].

48. Id. at 249.
49. Id.
50. In a study based on interviews with 38 judges, it was found that the judges
tended to categorize rape victims, affording each group a different level of credibility. The "genuine victim" was typified by the woman who was accosted and brutally
raped by a total stranger in a secluded area. The "consensual victim," because of
the circumstances surrounding the incident, was "asking for it." The third category
was the "vindictive female" who charged rape for an act which was wholly consensual or which never occurred. Bohmer, supra note 37, at 304-05. A judge's impression of the complainant directly and indirectly impacts on the course of the trial,
influencing evidentiary rulings and affecting the parties through the degree of empathy shown toward the complaining witness. Id. at 307.
51. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text f6r discussion of the concept
of vicim precipitation.
52. THE AMERICAN JURY, supra note 47, at 250 (emphasis added). As part of
Kalven and Zeisel's research methodology, judges were asked to complete questionnaires regarding recent criminal cases tried by a jury, providing general data as well
as describing the facts of the cases and attempting to explain the jury's actual verdict. See id.at 45-54; see also id. app. E.
53. The researchers found that the judges repeatedly cited drinking as an
explanation for the acquittal of defendants in criminal cases. "The suggestion is that
in some way this activity marks a crucial assumption of risk." Id. at 254-55.
54. Id.at 254.
55. See supra note 50.
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D.

MAKING THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME

In addition to the stringent evidentiary requirements under the
carnal knowledge statute, 6 the prosecution had a difficult time obtaining a conviction from a jury due to the single, harsh sentence
option. Prior to the passage of the Criminal Sexual Assault and Abuse
Act, Illinois had only one category for rape and deviate sexual
assault-the Class X non-probationable felony." The law made no
distinction for aggravating circumstances and failed to provide an intermediate misdemeanor offense applicable to adult victims. When
evidence was sparse or conflicting the accused could easily plea bargain
down to a lesser included offense such as assault, battery or
fornication. 8 In cases where the prosecution elected to pursue the
rape charge, juries often preferred to acquit rather than risk imposing a harsh penalty on a potentially innocent defendant."
Results reported in the Kalven and Zeisel study revealed that in
cases of "simple rape" 60 the jury chose to acquit the defendant in
sixty percent of the cases where the judge would have convicted.'
In instances where the rape involved aggravating circumstances, the
split in conviction/acquittal rate was not as substantial. In only twelve
percent of these cases the jury acquitted when the judge would have
found the defendant guilty.6 2 In the forty-two cases of simple rape
included in the study, the jury elected to convict the accused of rape
rather than a lesser charge in only three instances. 3 The percentage
of disagreement with the judge was nearly one hundred percent. 64 The

56. See supra notes 13-28 and accompanying text.
57. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-1(c) & 11-3(b) (1983). The term of imprisonment punishment for a Class X felony is "not less than 6 years and not more
than 30 years." Id. at § 1005-8-1(a)(3).

58. For instance, a 1979 study of the rape cases on file with the Cook County
State's Attorney's Office showed that more than 50o of these cases during the study
period were prosecuted as batteries, and that many of these were subsequently dismissed.

RAPE STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

82d Gen.

Assembly, at 51 (1982) [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE REPORT].
59. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
60. "Simple rape" is a term of art referring to all cases where no aggravating
circumstances are involved. "Aggravated rape," also a term of art, applies to cases
of overt violence, group rape or where the parties are strangers. See THE AMERICAN
JURY, supra note 47, at 252.
61. Id.at 253.
62. Id.
63. Id.at 253-54.
64. Id.
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authors concluded that if given a choice, the jury would find the defendant guilty of a lesser offense. However, absent an available alternative, juries would overwhelmingly elect to acquit. 65
Calling the crime a battery is clearly a misnomer when the offense involved forced sexual contact. Under the previous scheme, sex
offenders charged with battery were not properly categorized in the
criminal justice system nor recognized in the community," defeating
67
one of the essential purposes for the criminalization of rape. A better
approach is to grade sexual offenses in terms of the severity of the
personal intrusion and the degree of physical harm, and affix
accordingly the potential punishment. This approach was first adopted
in the Model Penal Code 8 and later in Michigan's Criminal Sexual
Conduct Statute. 69 A similar graded penalty70 provides the basic structural framework for the new Illinois law.
II.

OUTDATED ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING

THE OLD RAPE LAW

Long held beliefs and assumptions concerning the complaining
witness and the accused strongly colored the development of the consent and resistance standards and the evidentiary rules. Recent literature
and empirical data have exposed the invalidity of those premises,
culminating in a move toward major reform in recent years. This section will examine some of those early assumptions.
An unchaste woman is more likely to consent to an act of sexual
intercourse than one who is chaste." Until fairly recently, this major
premise underlying the early evidence rules was universally presumed
by courts. Consequently, defense attorneys were permitted to introduce
evidence of prior sexual conduct to show the victim's consent. This
evidentiary practice, designed to create a link between the victim's
character and her conduct at the time of the assault, was inconsistent
with evidentiary restrictions protecting the criminal defendant from
65. Id.at 254.
66. See generally G. Dix & M; SHARLOT, BASIC CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 65-86 (1980). Society has an interest in deterring such conduct through
the stigmatization of sex offender status and the imposition of an appropriate
punishment.

67. See generally infra note 66.

68. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 213 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
69. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520a-.5201 (Supp. 1983-1984).
70. See infra text accompanying note 130.
71. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 25 Ill. 2d 605, 611, 186 N.E.2d 30, 33 (1962),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 942 (1963); People v. Fryman, 4 Il1. 2d 224, 229, 122 N.E.2d

573, 576 (1954).
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a link between a remote character trait and the alleged crime. 72 Most
jurisdictions prohibit evidence of the defendant's bad character for
a trait commonly associated with the crime charged, such as dishonesty
in cases of theft or violence when the charge was murder." The link
between the victim's character for chastity and her conduct at the
time of the alleged assault is correspondingly tenuous. Previous sexual activity does not indicate that the person will later consent to
a forcible physical intrusion.
In many instances evidence of prior sexual conduct is especially
prejudicial to the complainant's case, often with tragic results.7" Introduction of collateral matters with limited probative value may confuse and distract the jury. Despite instructions to the contrary, too
much weight may be afforded such evidence.7 5 Today, with the frequency of premarital relations, 6 the chastity standard is not only unfair and prejudicial, but it is also an unreliable indicator of consent."
The practical effect of such a standard is to grant less protection to
a rape victim who has previously engaged in sexual relations.
72. J. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 188
(E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). Use of sexual history evidence to show consent "flies in
the face of the usual bar against circumstantial use of character for the sole purpose
of demonstrating the probability that one with a certain moral trait acted conformably with his nature at the specific time in question." Berger, supra note 31, at
19 (footnote omitted).
73. The policy behind the rule restricting character evidence is to prevent the
unjust conviction of an innocent defendant on the basis of collateral issues. FED.
R. EVID. 404(a) (Advisory Committee's Note). One exception to this rule applies
when the accused in a homicide trial pleads self-defense. He may introduce evidence
to show the victim's character for violence. Id. at 404(a)(2). This is roughly analogous
to the rape victim's character for unchastity. However, in the rape trial, danger of
unjust conviction is not nearly as great, since the victim typically is alive and may
testify and be cross-examined. Hence the need to rely on a remote and dubious inference is not as vital to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
74. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN JURY, supra note 47, at 251. In one case noted
by the authors, the judge involved described the rape as "savage," resulting in the
victim's jaw being fractured in two places. However, upon learning that the victim
and defendant engaged in previous sexual relations, the jury elected to acquit.
75. J. MCCORMICK, supra note 72, § 188, at 445; see also id. § 185.
76. According to one researcher, 7007o of all white single American women between the ages of 18 and 24 have engaged in sexual intercourse. In addition, 80%
of all married women studied were not virgins at the time they were married. M.
HUNT, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 1970s 149 (1974).
77. See Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF.
L. REV. 919 (1973). The author noted:
The concept of "chastity" is apparently based upon the nineteenth century
view that there are two kinds of women: "good" and "bad." Those who
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The victim's behavior, dress or manner precipitatedthe attack.
Some sociologists have suggested that victims of aggressive behavior

sometimes bring it upon themselves. In the rape situation, the theory
of victim precipitation posits that the victim's actions suggested or
encouraged the attack. 78

Placing the blame on the victim, holding her somehow responsible for the rape, creates a strong sense of guilt and self doubt,
aggravating the degree of psychological trauma." In a major study
which measured use of physical force in cases of forcible rape, it
was found that some degree of physical violence was used in eightyfive percent of the rapes studied.8" This data supports the view that

rape is a crime of aggression rather than of uncontrollable passion.
Further studies demonstrate the erroneous assumptions underlying the
rape precipitation theory. For instance, it was found that the sexual
assault was a planned event in almost seventy-five percent of the cases
reported.8 ' The rapists chose their .victims on the basis of their perceived

vulnerability; the victims' conduct was not precipitative.82
Although some activities, such as hitchhiking, increase the susceptibility of women to sexual attack, requiring modification of a woman's
everyday activities to avoid evoking a potentially dangerous sexual

are either faithful wives or virgins deserve the law's protection; women outside these groups are deemed unworthy of protection. The sharp differentiation between the faithful wife or virgin on one hand and the "loose"
woman on the other has long since disappeared, and its central role in rape
law is, at best, anachronistic. . . .The chastity requirement today places
significant numbers of women, rather than a few outcasts, beyond the protection of the law.
Id. at 939.
78. M. AMIR, supra note 32, at 154-55. Victim precipitation is a concept which
has gained prominence in the field of sociology and was first applied to the rape
victim by Amir in his study on forcible rape. Amir's analysis was modeled on a
survey of victim precipitation in homicide by Marvin Wolfgang. M. WOLFGANG, PATTERS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 245-65 (1958). Both writers draw a theoretical basis from
H. VON HENTIG, THE CRIMINAL AND His VICTIM ch. 12 (1948).
79. According to Amir, victim precipitation in rape occurs when "the victim
actually, or it was so deemed, agreed to sexual relations but retracted before the
actual act or did not react strongly enough when the suggestion was made by the

offender(s)." M. AMIR, supra note 32, at 266 (footnote omitted).

80. M. AMIR, supra note 32, at 155; see also infra note 156.
81. M. AMIR, supra note 32, at 213.
82. Los ANGELES COMM'N ON ASSAULTS AGAINST WOMEN, SURVIVING SEXUAL
ASSAULT 3 (1983). "[Rjapists look for available targets they perceive as vulnerable,
not women who dress in a particular way. No person asks to be hurt or degraded,
just as no one asks to be robbed because they are carrying money in their pocket."
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response clearly misplaces the responsibility for the attack. In reality,
the theory of rape precipitation is the "personification and embodiment of the rape mythology cleverly stated in academic-scientific
terms." 3

Characteristicsunique to the psychological makeup of women influence them to fabricate details of a rape scenario. Professor Wigmore
believed "unchaste" women to be pathological liars.8 ' He asserted
that the complainant should be subjected to an examination of her
social history and psychological state before the sex offense charge
could go to the jury." A comment to one draft of the Model Penal
Code suggested that women are tempted to bring rape charges out
of a sense of guilt, after engaging in, and possibly enjoying, sexual
intercourse.", Rape was characterized as a "subtle psych5logical problem in view of social and religious pressures upon the woman to conceive of herself as a victim rather than collaborator.""
Although many early commentators, most notably Wigmore,
greatly exaggerated the problem of the "abnormal" female psyche,
many jurisdictions give the trial judge discretion to order a psychiatric
examination of the victim if there is a compelling reason. It is argued
that the defendant should be allowed to introduce into evidence results
of psychiatric examinations supporting his claim that the victim is
emotionally disturbed. 89 During the Eighty-third General Assembly,

83. Weis & Borges, Victimology and Rape: The Case of the Legitimate Victim, 8 IssuEs IN CRIMINOLOGY 71, 87 (1973). That the victim somehow provoked
the attack is a widely accepted attitude in America.
84. See 3A J.WIGMORE, supra note 33, § 924a, at 736 (J.Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1970).
Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant young girls
and women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases. Their psychic
complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by
diseased derangements or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment, partly by temporary physiological or emotional conditions.
Id.at 736.
85. Id.at 737.
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, Comment at 264 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
87. Id.

88. See, e.g., Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49
Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966). The Ballard court ruled that it should be within the judge's
discretion to order a psychiatric examination when there is a compelling reason, as
when there is little or no corroborating evidence to support the charge, and the issue
of the complainant's mental or emotional health is raised. Id. at 172-79, 410 P.2d
at 846-49, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 310-14.
89. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 31, at 68. But see Comment, supra note 77,
at 933-34.
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the Illinois legislature amended the sexual history evidence statute,9"
prohibiting courts from "requir[ing] or order[ing] a witness who is
the victim of an alleged sex offense to submit to or undergo either
a psychiatric or psychological examination." 9'
Women use the rape charge as a weapon, out of a desire for
revenge, vindication or personal gain. "A rape accusation is so potent
a weapon against a man that a woman may deliberately and maliciously
distort her report of the sexual encounter to secure for herself money,
marriage, or revenge." 92 This statement, made over thirty years ago,
exemplifies a fear which is still very much alive, particularly in the
area of spousal rape.9 3 Under the new Illinois law, an action may
be brought for aggravated criminal sexual assault by a husband or
wife.9" Upon adoption of this bill, one state senator expressed his
fear that women would use the spousal rape law as a blackmailing
device in divorce battles" implying that a women might charge her
husband with rape intending to withdraw the complaint in exchange
for a larger property settlement.
The fear of a rise in false charges of spousal rape appears to
be unfounded, based on a study of the impact of Michigan's Criminal
Sexual Conduct Statute. The Michigan act removed the spousal exemption from rape prosecution when the parties are living apart and
one has filed for either separate maintenance or divorce.9" In the three
years immediately following the act's passage there was no increase
in the percentage of false rape reports.9 7 While there may be false
90. Act of Sept. 14, 1983, P.A. 83-289, 1983 I11.Legis. Serv. 1714 (West) (to
be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7.1).
91. Id.
92. Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation
and Objectives of the Consent Standard,62 YALE L.J. 55, 69 (1952) (footnote omitted).
93. The typical carnal knowledge statute exempts the husband from rape prosecution when the victim is his wife. Three common law rules justified the marital
exemption. At early common law a woman was considered the property of her husband or father. Rape laws were enacted to protect the woman's chastity, thereby
preserving for her possessor an asset of great value. A second concept commonly
adhered to was that, upon marriage, the husband and wife lose their separate legal
statutes and become one before the law. The most prevalent justification was that
by entering into the marriage contract, the wife agreed to have sexual intercourse
with her husband. Assuming that the marriage agreement is for life, the wife's irrevocable consent negates that element of the offense.
. 94. Criminal Sexual Assault and Abuse Act, P.A. 83-1067,
sec. 1, 1983 I11.
Legis. Serv. 7081 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-18(c)).
95. Chi. Sun Times, July 2, 1983, at 4, col. 1.
96. MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 750.5201 (Supp. 1983-1984); see also id. § 552.13
(alimony and suitable maintenance).
97. J. MARSH, A. GEIST & N. CAPLAN, RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM
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rape reports filed, statistics show that the percentage of rape reports
considered fabricated are essentially equal to percentages for "equally

serious crimes."

98

III.

NEW STATUTORY APPROACHES

"No other area of law is as dynamic and has been as successful
9 9 The
in changing public and legal perceptions as the law of rape."
Model Penal Code drafters may be credited with initiating the movement toward reform in all areas of penal codes, including sex crime
legislation.10 0 The Code integrated a variety of crimes into a series
of graded offenses, allowing flexible sentencing depending upon the
severity of the offense.' 0 1 Yet other aspects of the Model Penal Code
perpetuated traditional beliefs about rape as a sexual rather than an
assaultive offense. The provisions incorporated into the present draft
were first presented by the Institute in 1955,102 before the recent critical

and philosophical reassessments of the traditional assumptions.

The Code distinguishes between male and female victims of
forceful penetration. The rape provision applies to acts committed
by a man on a woman;' 0 3 the separate deviate sexual intercourse
section'"4 refers to "persons;" yet the elements of the offenses are
the same. The less serious crime of sexual assault applies to any sex5
ual contact short of penetration, and is gender neutral.' The Model
Penal Code incorporates a complete spousal exemption from rape

27, 28 (1982) [hereinafter cited as RAPE AND LAW REFORM]. While the number of
sexual assault reports generally increased, unfounded reports remained stable.
98. Id. at 86. It is the police officer who determines whether a rape report
is "unfounded." Police officers in Michigan were requested by researchers to compare the rate of unfounded sexual assault reports with those for "equally serious
crimes." While 25% felt that sexual assault was more often reported falsely, 35%
thought that the rates were approximately equal, and 40% felt that the unfounded
rate was actually higher for other "equally serious crimes." Id. at 103 n.2.
99. Nemeth, How New Jersey Prosecutors View The New Sexual Offense
Statutes, 111 N.J. L.J. 449, 449 (1983).
100. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 213 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See generally
Note, Justification: The Impact of the Model Penal Code on Statutory Reform, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 914 (1975); Sherry, CriminalLaw Revision in California,4 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 429, 434-38 (1971).
101. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 213 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
102. Id. art. 207 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
103. Id. at § 213.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
104. Id. at § 213.2(1).
105. Id. at § 213.4. Violations of the sexual assault section are classified as
misdemeanors.
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prosecution." °6 In cases of "date rape," where the victim was a volun-

tary social companion and had previously had sexual contact with
the defendant, the crime is reduced to a second degree felony." °7 The
rape is a first degree felony if the actor inflicted "serious bodily in-

jury upon anyone." '
The dramatic increase in sex offense legislation in the past two
decades may be attributed to numerous factors including a sharp increase in violent crime; enlightened public attitude toward the victim,
the perpetrator and the offense; the women's movement and feminist
activities;' 9 and, finally, legislative lobbyists who approached their
representatives armed with strong legal arguments against the old laws
and carefully drawn legislative alternatives. ' These combined social
and political forces made inevitable a re-examination of rape laws
which were inappropriate in modern society.
The Michigan Criminal Sexual Conduct Statute, enacted in 1975,
provided the nation's first model for comprehensive reform."' Supporters of the legislation had two primary objectives.'2 First, they
wanted to effect a change in cultural norms to enhance the status
of women in general, and in so doing to establish a public policy
in support of the sexual assault victim. Major legislation was the vehicle
106. Id. at §§ 213.1(1), .2(1), & .4.
107. "Date rape" commonly refers to situations where the parties are voluntary
social companions. The Model Penal Code added the stipulation that the victim had
previously permitted the defendant "sexual liberties." Id. at § 213.1.
108. Id. Section 213.1(a) indicates that a rape is committed if "(a) he compels
her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme
pain .

. . ."

However, unless actual injury was inflicted, the crime remained a second

degree felony. This language is an expression of traditional views about sexual
behavior. In more explicit terms, a New York assemblyman stated: " 'If her jaw
is broken, for example, that is proof of force. Otherwise, how do we know she
was raped? The difference between rape and romance is a very thin line.' " REDBOOK (Sept. 1972) reprinted in S. GRIFFIN, RAPE: THE POWER OF CONSCIOUSNEss 70
(1979).

109. See, e.g., S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 35. Brownmiller's work is the major
feminist statement in the area of rape. See also Greer, Seduction is a Four-Letter
Word, reprinted in RAPE VICTIMOLOGY 374 (L. Schultz ed. 1975); Griffin, Rape: The
All American Crime, reprinted in RAPE VICTIMOLOGY 19 (L. Schultz ed. 1975).
110. See, for example, the history of the passage of the Michigan statute in
RAPE AND LAW REFORM, supra note 97, at 11-24.
111. See MICH. CoMp. LAWs ANN. §§ 750.520a-.5201 (Supp. 1983-1984); see also
RAPE AND LAW REFORM, supra note 97, at 2, citing Bienen, Rape III-National
Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, WOMEN's RIGHTS LAW REPORTER 170-213
(1980).

112. RAPE AND LAW REFORM, supra note 97, at 4. The Michigan Women's Task
Force on Rape was responsible for drafting the bill and spearheading its passage
through the legislature.
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chosen because it represented "a classic use of law as an instrument
of social change."" ' 3 The supporters' second broad objective was to
increase the number of reports, arrests and convictions, which required
a direct, substantial impact on the criminal justice system."" Nationwide response to the Michigan law has been quite positive. Since 1975,
twenty-three states, including Illinois, have enacted "sexual conduct"
statutes. 'I
IV.

THE ILLINOIS LAW

The Illinois Criminal Sexual Assault and Abuse Act repeals eight
statutes' 16 and creates one comprehensive sexual assault
offense
sex
law with four gender neutral crimes." 7 Inadequacies in the existing
statute were recognized as early as 1974 when the Committee first
proposed reform legislation." 8 A more comprehensive revision, submitted in 1977,"' passed the General Assembly but was vetoed by
the Governor. 20 Variations on the legislation were proposed in subsequent sessions,' 2 ' but it was not until July, 1983 that the General
Assembly approved the current comprehensive revision, which became
effective July 1, 1984.122
In its report to the House of Representatives the Illinois Rape
Study Committee listed objectives paralleling those of the Michigan
Women's Task Force on Rape.' 2 3 In order to pursue these reform
113. Id. at 2.

114. Id. at 4, citing BenDor, Justice After Rape: Legal Reform in Michigan,
SEXUAL ASSAULT: THE VICTIM AND THE RAPIST (M. Waller & S. Broad-

reprinted in

sky eds. 1976).

115. See statutes listed supra note 1.

116. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-1 to 11-5, 11-10 & 11-11.1 (1983) (repealed
eff. July 1, 1984): § 11-I (rape), §§ 11-2, 11-3 (deviate sexual assault), § 11-4 (inde-

cent liberties with a child), § 11-4.1 (aggravated indecent liberties with a child), §
11-5 (contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child), § 11-10 (aggravated incest),
§ 11-11.1 (sexual abuse of a child by a family member). See P.A. 83-1067, 1983
Ill. Legis. Serv. 7134 (West).

117. See infra notes 124-27.
118. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 58, at 1.
119. H.B. 1185

LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS

AND

DIGEST.

120. Id.
121. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 58, at 1.
122. H.B. 606, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 83d Gen. Assembly
7709, 7949 (July 1,1983); JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, 83d Gen. Assembly 5010, 5141
(July 1, 1983). The measure passed in the House by a vote of one hundred thirteen
to three, with two voting "present," and in the Senate by fifty to one, with eight
voting "present."

123. See COMMITTEE

REFORM,

REPORT,

supra note 97, at 4.

supra note 58, at i; see also

RAPE AND LAW

[1984:355]

CRIMINAL SEXUAL ASSAULT ACT

objectives, the Illinois legislature incorporated the following innovations into the drafted legislation. First, the statute was reorganized
into a degree structure which recriminalizes rape and other forms of
sexual assault. Second, the law extended equal coverage to previously
unprotected groups through gender neutrality and partial removal of
the spousal exemption from rape prosecution. Finally, resistance and
consent requirements were eliminated, bringing the legal requirements
for sexual assault and abuse in line with standards used in the prosecution of other violent offenses.
A.

DEGREE STRUCTURE

The Criminal Sexual Assault and Abuse Act consolidates seven
nonconsensual crimes against both adults and children. The four new
crimes include Criminal Sexual Assault,'" Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault, 25' Criminal Sexual Abuse, 2 ' and Aggravated Criminal
Sexual Abuse.' 7 The two assault sections apply to acts of
penetration.' 28 The abuse crimes refer to "touching and fondling"

of bodily parts.' 29 The range of penalties incorporated into the degree
structure is based upon the seriousness and reprehensibility of the of-

fense, the degree of force used, the amount of personal injury, and
the vulnerability of the victim, dependent on factors such as age and
30
capacity to understand the offense.'

124. P.A. 83-1067, 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 7078 (West) (to be codified at ILL.
STAT. ch. 38, § 12-13).
125. Id. at 7078-79 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-14).
126. Id. at 7079-80 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-15).
127. Id. at 7080 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-16).
128. See infra note 156.
129. See infra note 155.
130. Penalties under the Criminal Sexual Assault and Abuse Act range in descending order of severity.
Aggravated criminal sexual assault is a Class X felony with a penalty of mandatory imprisonment for 6 to 30 years. See P.A. 82-1067, 1983 II1.Legis. Serv. 7078-79
(West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-14(c)); see also id. §
1005-8-1(a)(3).
Criminal sexual assault is a Class 1 felony imposing a penalty of 4 to 15 years
imprisonment. See 1983 I11. Legis. Serv. 7078 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 12-13(b)); see also id. § 1005-8-1(a)(4).
Aggravated criminal sexual abuse is a Class 2 felony with a penalty of 3 to
7 years imprisonment. See 1983 I11. Legis. Serv. 7080 (West) (to be codified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-16(c)); see also id. § 1005-8-1(a)(5).
Criminal sexual abuse is a Class A misdemeanor with a penalty of up to one
year imprisonment. See I11.Legis. Serv. 7079-80 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 12-15(c)); see also id. § 1005-8-3(a)(1). Subsequent convictions under
§ 12-15(a) constitute Class 2 felonies.
REV.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

Criminal sexual assault is the basic penetration provision.' 3 ' It
is further subdivided to protect three categories of victims. The first
subsection requires a showing of an act of sexual intercourse accompanied by force or threat of force. 3 2 The remaining two subsections
are designed to protect two classes of particularly vulnerable victims.
The first of these applies to victims unable to understand the nature
of the offense, or unable to give effective consent; the second applies
to victims of parental incest.' 33
The new law does not define which victims would be incapable
of understanding the act or effectively consenting. The Illinois Rape
Study Committee had received the suggestion that all terms used in
the proposed legislation be clearly defined to remove any doubt as
to legislative intent, including terms such as "mental disability," "mental incapacity" and "physical helplessness." 3 As enacted, however,
such impairments are not considered aggravating factors.'" In contrast, a female who was either "mentally deranged or deficient" could
131. P.A. 82-1067, 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 7078 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 12-13). The language of the new sections is as follows:
Criminal Sexual Assault. (a) The accused commits criminal sexual assault
if he or she:
(1) commits an act of sexual penetration by the use of force or threat
of force; or
(2) commits an act of sexual penetration and the accused knew that
the victim was unable to understand the nature of the act or was unable
to give effective consent; or
(3) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under
18 years of age when the act was committed and the accused was a parent
or grandparent, whether by whole blood, half-blood or adoption.
132. Id. at § 12-13(a)(1).
133. Id. at § 12-13(a)(2), (3). See id. at § 4-5 (defining "knowledge").
134. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 58, at 3.
135. When the offense charged is aggravated criminal sexual assault, factors
in aggravation include: using a dangerous weapon, causing bodily harm to the victim, placing the victim in a life endangering situation, committing the act in the
course of another felony, or assaulting a victim 60 years of age or older. See
§ 12-14(a). Subsection (b) applies to minor victims, providing:
(b) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if he or
she commits an act of sexual penetration:
(1) with a victim who is under 13 years of age when the act was
committed and the accused was 17 years of age or over; or
(2) with a victim who was under 9 years of age when the act was
committed and the accused was under 17 years of age; or
(3) with a victim who was at least 9 years of age but under 13
years of age and the accused was under 17 years of age and the accused
used force or the threat of force to commit the act.
P.A. 83-1067, 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 7079 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
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prosecute under the repealed rape section, allowing imposition of
harsher penalties.136
The basic penetration section also applies to victims of incest who
are under eighteen years of age.' 37 The coverage of potential abusers
in this section is limited to either parents or grandparents by "whole
blood, half-blood or adoption."' 38 Such limited language disregards
other potential familial offenders who may pose a significant threat.
These include aunts, uncles and close-affinity cousins. 13 9 The definitional section' 40 of the new act gives a fairly inclusive definition of
"family member," but it is not used in any penal section of the act.''
Furthermore, the definition requires the family member to have resided
in the household with the child for at least one year. ' 2 The rationale
for this one year requirement is unclear.
As a practical matter, in cases of familial sexual assault not
covered by the basic penetration section and not involving the use
of a weapon or bodily harm to the victim, charges may be brought
for aggravatedcriminal sexual assault when the victim is under thirteen
and the accused is over seventeen; when the victim is under nine and
the accused is under seventeen; or when the victim is between nine
and thirteen and the accused is under seventeen and used force or
threat of force. Any sexual penetration or conduct with a victim age
thirteen but under sixteen constitutes the misdemeanor of criminal
sexual abuse. '4 Most victims thus will be protected, although a child
between the age of nine and thirteen, subjected by an actor under
age seventeen to coercive force not sufficient to satisfy the "force
or threat of force" requirement of subsection (b)(3), may be the vic-

ch. 38, § 12-14(b)).
Aggravating factors to a charge of criminal sexual abuse include the display
of, or a threat to use, a dangerous weapon, or conduct which results in great bodily
harm to the victim. Additionally, acts of sexual conduct with minors constitute aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Id. at 7080 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 12-16).
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1(a)(2) (1983) (repealed eff. July 1, 1984).
137. P.A. 83-1067, 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 7078 (West) (to be codified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-13(a)(3)).
138. Id.
139. Sexual relations between siblings is addressed at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 11-11 (1983).
140. P.A. 83-1067, 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 7077 (West) (to be codified at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-12(c)).
141. See id. at 7094, amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(e) (1983).
142. Id. at 7078.
143. Id. at 7079 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-15(b)).
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tim of incestuous sexual assault for which the law provides no
punishment."'
Although an incest charge for aggravated criminal sexual assault
is possible under the new law, it appears to be contrary to the
legislature's intent. Only in the criminal sexual assault and aggravated
criminal sexual abuse sections is reference made to acts between family
members.' 5 Also, in a separate penalty section it is provided that
a defendant who is a family member and who is convicted of either
criminal sexual assault or aggravated criminal sexual abuse may be
sentenced to probation.'" 6 Apparently, the aggravated sexual assault
section is only intended to cover incidents between child victims and
strangers.
There are two additional problems with the criminal sexual assault
section as it relates to victims of incest and victims who are unable
The first flaw is the ambiguity of the
to give effective consent.'
statute's language. The significance of the language used was
demonstrated in a survey of prosecutors in New Jersey to determine
their views concerning a newly enacted sexual conduct statute. It was
found that a portion of the prosecutors, although satisfied with the
144. Id. at 7079 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-14(b)(1)-(3)).
For instance, an extended-family scenario can be imagined where sexual penetration
occurs between an uncle of age 15 and a niece of age 12 accompanied by threats
other than those of physical harm. See id. at 7078, § 12-12(d) (defining "force or
threat of force"). As the sections currently read, this act would not be penalized.
Ironically, once the niece reaches the age of 13, any act of sexual penetration or
conduct would then be criminalized under the criminal sexual assault section. Id.
at 7079, § 12-15(b).
145. Id. at 7078 & 7080 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 12-13
& 12-16).

Legis. Serv. 7092-94 (West) (amending ILL. REV.
146. See P.A. 83-1067, 1983 111.
ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(e)). Probation is included as a penalty option because the
legislature intended to provide the greatest flexibility in the case of intrafamilial sexual assault given the complex dynamics of the family relationship. Legislative Fact
Sheet, H.B. 606, as amended, 83d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1983) (unpublished
summary of the bill distributed to legislators prior to action on the bill).
147. Use of the phrase "effective consent" creates another problem. The word
"consent" contradicts recommendations of professionals received by the Rape Study
Committee. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 58, at 3. Its use also implies that
consent is still an element of the offense, which defeats the Rape Study Committee's
suggestion to define the criminal sexual assault solely "in terms of the conduct of
the offender." Id. at 107. The New Jersey sexual assault statute completely avoids
use of the word consent throughout the statute and in referring to this particular
group of victims. The language protects a victim "whom the actor knew or should
have known was physically helpless, mentally defective or mentally incapacitated."
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:14-2(a)(5)(b), (c)(2) (West 1982).
STAT.
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design of the statute, were displeased with the wording and construction relating to various mentally incapacitated persons or those incapacitated by age. 14 8' The terms were adequately defined in the definitional section but were not covered in other provisions of the New
Jersey law. The second criticism of the Illinois act is that neither parental incest, nor inability to give effective consent, both of which which
make the victims particularly vulnerable, are raised to the level of
14 9
an aggravated offense in cases of sexual assault.
Criminal sexual abuse requires an act of sexual conduct accompanied by force or threat of force. 5 ' It is also intended to protect
victims who are unable to understand the nature of the offense or
who are unable to give effective consent. Subsection (b) is the
equivalent of what previously was criminalized as contributing to the
'
sexual delinquency of a minor. 51
B.

PERSONS PROTECTED BY THE NEW LAW

One of the major concerns of supporters of the Illinois act was
to draft a law recognizing that sexual assault victims and offenders
may be of either gender. The drafters achieved neutrality by deleting
the word "rape" and other sexually connotative terms and by referring to the victim as' "he or she." 5 ' By defining rape as involving
"[a] male person . . . who has sexual intercourse with a female""'
the previous statute placed exclusive emphasis on the traditional
male/female sex act. In failing to mention other forms of forced sexual conduct, the preceding law focused on the sexual rather than
148. Nemeth, supra note 99, at 466. When asked to suggest reforms for the
new sex offense statute, 34% of the responding prosecutors suggested a reclarification of such terms as "mentally defective." The New Jersey statute provided additional protection to mentally defective victims if the actor was aided or abetted by
another person, or was in a supervisory relationship over the victim. N.J. STAT.
ANN. 2C:14-2(a)(5)(b), (c)(3) (West 1982).
149. See 1983 I1. Legis. Serv. 7078 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 12-13(a)(2), (3)). In the Michigan Criminal Sexual Conduct Statute both
of these conditions are included in the first degree offense section. In addition, the
Michigan incest provision extends to the fourth degree of affinity. MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.520b(l)(b) (incest); id. § 750.520b(l)(d)(i) (mentally defective, mentally
incapacitated or physically helpless and the actor is aided or abetted by one or more
persons).
150. 1983 II. Legis. Serv. 7079 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 12-15).
151. Id., § 12-15(b).

152. E.g., id. at 7078 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-13(a):
"The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he or she .... " (emphasis added).
153. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (1983) (repealed eff. July 1, 1984).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

assaultive nature of the crime."" The definition section of the new
act is correspondingly neutral, with precise language allowing a greater
number and a larger variety of cases to be prosecuted.' 5 5 "Penetration" is broadly defined' and the definition of "bodily harm" includes injuries clearly sustainable by a male victim.' 5 7
Prior to the mid 1970's virtually every jurisdiction had adopted
the complete spousal exemption from rape prosecution through common law interpretation or in codified form.' 5 8 In recent years there
has been an explosion of reform legislation in the area of spousal
rape. ' While a few states have completely removed the exemption,' 6
the majority have made piece-meal revisions. Most often the exemption is removed when one of the parties has petitioned the court for
legal separation or divorce.' 6 ' In addition, most states require that
the offense involve penetration rather than sexual conduct alone.' 6 2

154. M. AMIR, supra note 32, at 154-55. According to Amir's data, there was
some overt form of violence in 85% of the rapes studied. Elements of force used
were broken down into classifications: roughness (holding, pushing) 28.5%; brutal
beating (slugging, kicking) 20.4%; non-brutal beating (slapping) 24.7%; and choking
or gagging 11.5%. Additionally, in 41.2% of the reported cases, there was intimidation by means of physical gestures and verbal threats while in 21.1% of the cases
there was intimidation with a weapon or object.
155. P.A. 83-1067, 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 7077-78 (West). See id. at 7078 (to
be codified at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 § 12-12(e)): "Sexual conduct" includes inten-

tional "touching or fondling . . . of the sex organs, anus or breast of the [adult]

victim or the accused, or any part of the body of a child under 13 years of age . .. ."
156. Id. at 7078 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-12(f)). Sexual
penetration includes cunnilingus, fellatio and anal intrusion but is not limited to these
offenses. The definition includes penetration by sex organ or object. Acts involving
animals are within the definition.
157. Id. at 7077 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-12(b)). " 'Bodily harm' means physical harm, and includes, but is not limited to, sexually transmitted disease, pregnancy and impotence."
158. H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 163 (1980).
159. See Freeman, "But If You Can't Rape Your Wife Who[m] Can You
Rape?": The Marital Rape Exemption Re-examined,* 15 FAM. L.Q. 1, 23-26 (1981).
See generally Note, The Marital Rape Exemption: Legal Sanction of Spousal Abuse,
18 J. FAM. L. 565 (1980); Comment, Spousal Exemption to Rape, 65 MARQ. L.
REV. 120 (1981).
160. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:14-5(b) (West 1982).
161. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-407(1) (1978). "The provisions of this part shall
not apply to conduct between persons married t each other; provided, however,
that for purposes of this part, persons living apart pursuant to a lawful order of
a court of competent jurisdiction shall not be deemed to be married."
162. See supra note 155. Sexual conduct typically refers to "touching or
fondling."
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Prior to the current reform, Illinois retained the complete common law exemption.'63 A spouse may now bring charges against a
mate, although only under the aggravated criminal sexual assault

provision.' 64 In addition, the victim is required to report any viola-

tion to the proper authority within thirty days of the incident or prosecution is barred, unless there is a finding of "good cause" for the
delay.' 6 5 A conviction for spousal sexual assault, as a Class X felony,
does not include the possibility of probation.' 66
C.

FORCE AS THE MAJOR ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE

The new Illinois act eliminates the "reasonable resistance" requirement. The act makes consent an affirmative defense, yet the lack
of verbal or physical resistance, or actual submission by the victim,
does not constitute consent when the perpetrator uses force or threat
of force.' 67 Removal of the consent standard is not as drastic a measure
as some critics would contend. As noted earlier, recent Illinois decisions have substantially liberalized the reasonable resistance standard.' 68
Force or threat of force' 69 is now the major element, and must
be proven for all four degrees of criminal sexual assault, except when
the victim belongs to the category of particularly vulnerable victims. "'
House Bill 606, as approved by the legislature, originally included

163. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (1983) (repealed eff. July 1, 1984).
164. 1983 I11.Legis. Serv. 7081 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 12-14). The Governor's amendatory veto of the spousal rape section provided
a substantially more liberal provision than that originally adopted by the legislature.
The original draft required that for charges to be brought for a sexual penetration
offense some type of legal action related to dissolution of marriage had to be on
file in a court of competent jurisdiction, or the couple had to have been residing
in separate residences at the time of the incident. In addition, any one of three
aggravating circumstances was required.
165. Id. at 7081 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-18(c)).
166. Id. at 7079 (to be codified at § 12-14(c)); id. at 7093, amending ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(c)(2)(c).
167. Id. at 7080 (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-17(a)).
168. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
169. "Force or threat of force" means the use of physical force or violence,
or the threat of physical force or violence, including but not limited to the
following situations:
(1) when the accused threatens to use physical force or violence on
the victim or on any other person, and the victim under the circumstances
reasonably believed that the accused had the ability to execute that threat; or
(2) when the accused has overcome the victim by use of superior
strength or size, physical restraint or physical confinement.
1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 7078 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-12(d)).
170. See supra text accompanying note 133.
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"coercion" in the definition of this element, along with force. The
Governor removed the term in his amendatory veto,' 7 ' thereby
eliminating a wide range of circumstances under which sexual assault
may occur. '72 He reasoned that coercion, interpreted narrowly, is
included within the definition of force.' 3 It was his fear that the term
would be broadened to apply to situations where one would use a
position of authority to compel another to submit to sexual
intercourse-as, for example, in the workplace.' 7
This guarded approach frustrates the policies underlying the new
law: to prevent threat of physical and emotional harm to the individual,
to protect society from such undesirable behavior and to allow freedom
of sexual choice. It also fails to recognize established case law where
mental coercion has been found sufficient to support a charge of
rape."' Finally, it contradicts the trend in the majority of states which
have adopted criminal sexual assault type statutes to include both force
and coercion within the definition-of the offense.' 6

171. Amendatory Veto Message, H.B. 606, 83d Gen. Assembly (Sept. 23, 1983)
(available through the Office of the Governor).
172. M. AMIR, supra note 32, at 154. According to Amir, non-physical force
in the form of coercion was present in almost 25% of 646 rapes in his study. Examples
of verbal coercion include, but are not limited to, threats of future retaliation against
the victim, the victim's family members or friends, intimidation by an individual
whom the victim perceives as an authority figure, and an employer's threat to fire
an employee for non-compliance.
173. Amendatory Veto Message, H.B. 606, 83d Gen. Assembly, at 4.
174. Id.
175. Hughes v. United States, 306 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (threat of harm
to third person is sufficient to show nonconsent).
176. For example, the Michigan Criminal Sexual Conduct Statute states in part:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct . . . ifhe or she
engages in sexual penetration . . . and if any of the following circumstances
exists:
(b) . . .the actor is in a position of authority over the victim
and used this authority to coerce the victim to submit,
(e) The actor is armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned
in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon
(f) The actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or coercion is used to accomplish sexual penetration. Force or coercion includes
but is not limited to any of the following circumstances:
(i) When the actor overcomes the victim through the actual
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V.

IMPACT OF REFORM LEGISLATION

Because the Illinois Criminal Sexual Assault and Abuse Act was
largely patterned after the Michigan statutory revision, the impact of
the Michigan act may provide a preview of anticipated changes in
Illinois following the implementation of the new act. In the years since
Michigan's comprehensive reform measure went into effect in 1975,'7
a wave of sex offense legislation swept the country.' 78 Several states
have adopted sexual conduct-type codes,' 79 while others have chosen
the incremental approach. Whether supporters achieved their objective of improving the status of women in general and sexual assault
victims in particular is not a question readily given to empirical
measure. However, notable changes have occurred in the Michigan
criminal justice system and in the rate of reports, arrests and
80
convictions. '
A comprehensive study of the initial impact of the Michigan
Criminal Sexual Conduct Statute was conducted, using data compiled
from the three years before and the three years after the law was
enacted. Because the Michigan law was the first of its kind, specific
results may be somewhat unique to the Michigan experience, but the
results are illustrative of general trends and allow a guarded optimism
on the success of sexual conduct statutes.
The data gathered in the Michigan study showed an increase in
the number of reported sexual assaults. 8 ' Several factors were suggested as responsible for the increase, including changes in social and
cultural values, quantitatively and qualitatively better support services
for the victim, and the dramatic increase in violent crime during the
application of physical force or physical violence.
(ii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening
to use force or violence on the victim, and the victim believes that the
actor has the present ability to execute these threats.
(iii) When the actor coerces the'victim to submit by threatening
to retaliate in the future against the victim, or any other person, and the
victim believes that the actor has the ability to execute this threat.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b (Supp. 1983-1984).
177. Id. §§ 750.520a -.5201.

178. See supra note 1.
179. See supra note 7.
180. See RAPE AND LAW REFORM, supra note 97, for a comprehensive analysis
of the law reform study of Michigan's Criminal Sexual Conduct Statute.
181. Id. at 26-27. The authors relied on data derived from uniform crime reports
of the Michigan state police and case records from the Detroit Police Department
Sex Crimes Unit. See id. at 25-39; see also DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORT FOR THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

1975; id., 1977.
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early 1970's. 82 The Michigan study revealed that the reporting increase was completely independent of the new law.' 83 However there
were significant increases in arrest and conviction rates.' 84 Additionally,
the incidence of plea-bargaining was reduced, resulting in an increase
in the number of convictions reached on the original charge.' 85 Finally, the number of unfounded reports of sexual assault remained steady,
contrary to the predictions of those who believed that the new law
would increase the number of illegitimate claims, placing an undue
burden of the criminal justice system.' 86 The authors of the study
concluded that the sexual conduct act fulfilled its expectations, having its greatest impact on the number of convictions, as most of the
law's provisions affect the conduct of sexual assault trials.' 87
VI.

CONCLUSION

Recent legislative reforms in the area of assaultive sexual conduct have had a powerful impact, not only on the status of women,
but also for all victims of violent sexual assault, and for the criminal
justice system itself. The Illinois Criminal Sexual Assault and Abuse
Act provides a comprehensive reform, repealing the outdated traditional approach. The new law affords far greater protection for the
victim while balancing the interests of the accused. Despite these improvements, there remains an area requiring revision. The legislation
is ambiguous in its coverage of certain vulnerable groups most in need
182. RAPE AND LAW REFORM, supra note 97, at 26-28. During the years for which
study data were collected, 1973 through 1977, the arrest rate for forcible rape increased 61%. However, during the first half of 1982, there was a six percent decrease
in the number of rapes reported nationally in comparison to the same period in
1981. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 1982, cited in
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 58, at 34. Illinois experienced a similar decrease in
the number of reported rape offenses from 1979 through 1981. COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 58, at 35.

183.

RAPE AND LAW REFORM,

supra note 97, at 28 & 38 n.12.

184. Id. at 29-31 & 38 nn.11-14. Contra Comment, supra note 77, at 927 n.42.
Using statistics from the 1970 Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports,

the author found that even when a rape was reported to the police, the defendant
had one chance in eight of being convicted. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LEAA, FORCIBLE RAPE: FINAL PROJECT REPORT

(1978), cited in RAPE AND LAW REFORM, supra note 97, at 39 n.16. The Michigan

rate is high even in comparison with statistics for Seattle and Kansas City compiled

by the Institute. In that study it was shown that forty-five percent of all arrests

resulted in conviction.
185. RAPE AND LAW
186. Id. at 28.
187. Id. at 36-37.

REFORM,

supra note 97, at 29-31.
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of protection. These include young victims of sexual assault committed by household members; victims who are physically incapacitated,
mentally incapacitated or mentally disabled; and victims who are
coerced without the threat of imminent bodily harm. Until these victims are afforded the necessary protection against criminal sexual
assault and abuse, the new Illinois act fails to fully address the needed reforms in the reactionary rape laws it sought to supplant.
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